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No. 20150980-SC
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SALT LAKE CITY,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RANDALL JOSEPHSON,

Defendant/Appellant.
REPLACEMENT REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
After this case was certified from the Court of Appeals to this Court, this
Court issued an order permitting replacement briefing. This Court instructed the
parties that replacement briefs "should be submitted only if the posture before
the Supreme Court creates a material difference in the argument presented (e.g.,
the argument already briefed relied on authority that would be binding on the
Court of Appeals but not on the Supreme Court)." Replacement Briefing Order
dated Jan. 18,

2018.

Josephson filed a replacement opening brief on February 20,

2018.

In

compliance with the Replacement Briefing Order, Josephson made the same
arguments he made in the Court of Appeals but, where possible, cited to authority
that would be binding on the Supreme Court instead of authority that would only
be binding on the Court of Appeals.
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By contrast, the City's replacement response brief is substantially different
~

than the brief it filed in the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the City
argued as follows: (1) because stalking is a cumulative offense, an overlap in
evidence between two prosecutions does not trigger double jeopardy, Aple. Br. Ct.
App. 8-15, and (2) the trial court's refusal to merge the convictions was not plain
error because the issue was unpreserved and because the evidence at trial did not
present the two crimes as having a greater-lesser relationship. Id. at 15-20.
In the replacement response brief, the City now argues as follows. First,
threat of violence is not a lesser included offense of stalking because Utah's threat
of violence statute, Utah Code section 76-5-107(5), specifically exempts threat of
violence from ever being a lesser included offense and because "each offense has
unique elements." Aple. Br. 13-21. Second, this Court should exempt stalking

~

from Utah's single criminal episode laws to avoid giving defendants "one free
stalk" in the name of protecting them from double jeopardy. Id. at 21-30. Third,
Josephson did not preserve the single criminal episode issue and did not carry his
burden in showing the prosecutor knew about the offenses when Josephson was
arraigned on the first information. Id. at 31-34. Finally, the trial court's refusal to

~

merge the convictions was not plain error. Id. at 38.
Josephson's replacement reply brief responds to the arguments raised in
the City's replacement response brief. The City's arguments fail. As addressed
below and in Josephson's opening brief, this Court should reverse Josephson's
stalking conviction and remand for dismissal because the threat of violence and
2
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(ij;

stalking charges have a greater-lesser relationship, and Utah's single criminal
~

episode statute applies to this case. See infra Part I; Aplt. Br. 11-34. In the
alternative, as explained below and in opening, this Court should reverse the
threat of violence conviction and remand for dismissal because the trial court
plainly erred by refusing to merge convictions at sentencing. See infra Part II;
Aplt. Br. 34-38.
As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), this brief is

"limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the appellee's
~

... principal brief." Josephson does not concede any matters not addressed in this
reply brief but believes that those matters are adequately addressed in his
opening brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b). The brief does not address matters that
do not merit reply.
ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court prosecution was barred by Utah's lesser
included offense and single criminal episode laws.
The district court prosecution was barred by Utah's lesser included offense

and single criminal episode laws.

A

Threat of violence is a lesser included offense of stalking under the
facts of this case.

Threat of violence is a lesser included offense of stalking for purposes of
claim preclusion under Utah Code section 76-1-402(3), regardless of the language
in Utah Code section 76-5-107(5). Utah Code section 76-5-107(5) reads: "A
person who commits an offense under this section is subject to punishment for
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that offense, in addition to any other offense committed, including the carrying
out of the threatened act." (Emphasis added).
The City argues this subsection "operates as a complete bar on threat of
violence merging into stalking," and consequently, operates to preclude threat of
violence from ever being a lesser included offense of stalking for any purpose,
particularly for purposes of claim preclusion under section 76-1-402(3). Aple. Br.
16.
As a threshold matter, the City conflates the two doctrines of merger and

claim preclusion oflesser included offenses and discusses them in the same
section. Aple. Br. 13. Although the two are related because they are derived from
the same statutory scheme, section 76-1-402, they operate differently. Compare

State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,I 8, 46 P.3d 230 {explaining that merger applies after
conviction rather than before trial) with Utah Code§ 76-1-402(1) ("[A]n acquittal
or conviction and sentence under [a provision constituting a lesser included
offense] bars a prosecution under [a provision constituting a greater offense]").
This section discusses the doctrine precluding subsequent convictions for a
greater or lesser offense, while Part II discusses merger.
The City's argument that threat of violence is not a lesser included offense
of stalking fails because section 76-5-107(5) refers to punishments rather than
convictions. The City cites Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)
(Stewart, J., concurring), for the proposition that it does not violate the

4
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constitution when the legislature exempts a crime from being considered a lesser
included offense of another. Aple. Br. 14.

Albernaz is a case in which the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
import marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana and were given
consecutive sentences. 450 U.S. at 333. The Court held it was not
unconstitutional for the legislature to impose consecutive sentences for the two
crimes that were part of a single agreement but had dual objectives. Id. at 336.
The question at issue in that case involved consecutive punishments-not
~

consecutive convictions. Id.
Similarly, the language in section 76-5-107(5) pertains to punishments and
not convictions. Had the legislature intended to exempt threat of violence from
being considered a lesser included offense for purposes of section 76-1-402, it
could have used the language, "A person who commits an offense under this
section is subject to [conviction and punishment] for that offense, in addition to
any other offense committed." See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ,i 12, 150 P.3d
540 ("Had that been the Legislature's intent .. .it easily could have said so"); see

also infra Part II (threat of violence statute does not preclude merger). Instead,
the statute is worded as an enhancement of punishment, specifying a separate
punishment for a threat of violence offense but remaining silent on the possibility
of consecutive convictions. Utah Code§ 76-5-107(5); see also State v. Smith,
2005 UT 57, ,i 10, 122 P.3d 615 (recognizing that enhancement provisions "are
different in nature than other criminal statutes because they single out particular
5
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characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher punishment.")
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); Utah Code§ 58-37-8 (statute
enhancing the minimum punishment for a charge of possession with intent to
distribute when certain conditions are present). Section 76-5-107(5) does not say
there is no situation in which threat of violence can be a lesser included offenseit merely provides for additional punishment when a threat of violence has been
made in addition to other conduct. 1
Additionally, section 76-1-402(3) allows threat of violence to be a lesser
included offense for purposes of claim preclusion. Section 76-1-402(3) sets forth

Gt,

the conditions under which an offense may be a lesser included of another for
purposes of claim preclusion:
An offense is so included when:

(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by statute as a lesser included offense.

There are no Utah cases that interpret Utah Code section 76-5-107(5) at all.
However, the language in section 76-5-107(5) about additional punishment
mirrors the language of enhancement provisions such as section 76-3-203.1(2),
which provides that a person who commits certain offenses is "subject to an
enhanced penalty for the offense" when certain conditions are met. (Emphasis
added).
1

6
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~

(Emphasis added). The statute expands the situations in which an offense is a
lesser included offense for purposes of claim preclusion beyond those instances
in which the legislature has specifically designated the offense as a lesser
included offense. 2 Id. As explained in Josephson's opening brief, because threat
of violence "is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of [stalking]," it is a lesser included offense for
purposes of claim preclusion under section 76-1-402. Aplt. Br. 13-19; State v.
Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156
Ci)

(Utah 1983).
In sum, for the reasons stated here and in opening, this Court should
reverse Josephson's stalking conviction and remand for dismissal.

B.

Utah's single criminal episode statute applies under the facts of this
case and heightens the protection provided by the double jeopardy
clause.

Regardless of whether there is a greater-lesser relationship between the
justice court threat of violence and the district court stalking charges, they stem
from the same criminal episode, so Utah's single criminal episode statute is
controlling.
The Legislature specifically uses the language "is a lesser included offense" to
designate certain offenses as lesser included offenses of another. See Utah Code §
41-1a-1314 ("A violation of [unauthorized control for extended time] is a lesser
included offense of theft"); Utah Code§ 76-6-404.5(4) ("Wrongful appropriation
is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft"). If it had intended to exempt
threat of violence as a lesser included offense of stalking in every context, it just
as easily could have used the language "threat of violence is not a lesser included
offense of stalking" or even "threat of violence is not a lesser included offense of
any other charge."
2

7
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The City argues that to conclude Utah's single criminal episode statute
barred the stalking prosecution would be to "allow a stalker to continue a pattern
of stalking behavior and be protected under the shield of double jeopardy." Aple.
Br. 22 (quoting State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Iowa 2013)). The City's
argument fails because it relies on out-of-state case law not binding on this court,
the out-of-state case law is distinguishable, and it is the City's burden to show the
prosecuting attorney did not know about the conduct underlying both
prosecutions at the time the defendant was arraigned on the first information.
First, the out-of-state case law the City relies on is not binding on this

~

Court. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ,r 19 n.2, 194 P.3d 913 (explaining that an
out-of-state court's interpretations of its own constitution and statutes are not
binding on Utah); see also Aple. Br. 22-28 (citing Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1; Jones v.

State, 915 So.2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Commonwealth v. Roefaro, 691 A.2d
472 (Pa. Super. 1997)).

~

Second, the out-of-state cases are distinguishable because the fact patterns
therein would not trigger heightened protections under Utah's single criminal
episode statute. Utah's single criminal episode statute extends the protections of
double jeopardy and sets forth the terms under which "a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses ... arising out of a single criminal
episode." Utah Code§§ 76-1-402(1)(2). The terms that must exist are:

8
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1. "The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court," (Utah
Code§ 76-1-402(2)(a));
2. "The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time
the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment,"
(Utah Code § 76-1-402(2)(b));
3. "[T]he former prosecution ... resulted in conviction," (Utah Code§§
76-1-403(1), (1)(a), (1)(b)(ii)); and
4. The offenses are part of a "single criminal episode," which
includes
a. "all conduct which is closely related in time," and
b. "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective" (Utah Code§ 76-1-401).
As demonstrated below, the out-of-state cases the City relies on involve fact

patterns in which the defendant committed additional stalking behavior after
having been convicted of stalking. See Lindell, 828 N .W.2d at 1-4; Jones, 915
So.2d at 78-81; Roefaro, 691 A.2d at 472-73. Because the behavior underlying the
second prosecution in those cases began after the conviction in the first
prosecution, the facts do not meet all of the elements of Utah's single criminal
episode statute, and the statute would not bar the subsequent prosecution. Utah
Code§§ 76-1-401 to -403; See Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1; Jones, 915 So.2d 78;
~

Roefaro, 691 A.2d 472.
In Lindell, the defendant engaged in a course of conduct from April 2010 to
August 2010 that constituted a stalking charge to which Lindell pled guilty on
December 15, 2010. 828 N.W.2d at 3. After pleading guilty, Lindell engaged in
subsequent behavior in January 2011 that constituted another stalking charge,
among other charges. Id. He then unsuccessfully argued his constitutional right
9
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to be protected from double jeopardy was violated when the State introduced
~

evidence of the prior convictions in the prosecution for the subsequent stalking
conduct. Id. at 4.
Likewise, in Roefaro, the defendant pied no contest to two counts of

~

stalking in the spring of 1994, based on conduct that happened previously. 691
A.2d at 4 72-73. After he pied no contest, he placed unwanted gifts and letters on
the porch of the victim's sister's home. Id. at 473. He was then charged with

~

additional crimes and unsuccessfully argued his right to be free from double
jeopardy "was violated because the Commonwealth introduced appellant's prior
stalking convictions in order to establish the 'course of conduct' element for the
present stalking offenses." Id. at 473-74.
Similarly, in Jones, Jones was convicted of criminal trespass and domestic
violence for an incident involving victim K.T. on September 19, 2000. 915 So.2d
at So. After having been convicted, Jones started leaving strange items in K.T.'s
mother's mailbox and began a campaign of additional violence against K.T. Id. at
80-81. He was subsequently prosecuted for the crimes that happened after his
first conviction and unsuccessfully argued that double jeopardy precluded the
State from introducing evidence of the criminal trespass and domestic violence in
the stalking prosecution. Id. at 81.
The question before the courts in the out-of-state cases was whether the
government violated the defendants' protections against double jeopardy when it
used evidence of the prior stalking conduct in the later prosecutions for
10
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subsequent stalking conduct. See Lindell, 828 N.W.2d at 4; Jones, 915 80.2d at
83; Roefaro, 691 A.2d at 474-75. Here, Josephson does not argue the trial court
erred by admitting evidence of the justice court threat of violence in his stalking
prosecution. Rather, Josephson argues the stalking prosecution was barred by
Utah's single criminal episode statute.

If Utah's single criminal episode framework were applied to each of the fact
patterns in Lindell, Roefaro, and Jones, the subsequent prosecutions would not
be barred because the conduct underlying the second prosecution happened after
the conviction in the first prosecution. Utah Code§§ 76-1-401 to -403; see also

Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1; Jones, 915 80.2d 78; Roefaro, 691 A.2d 472. Accordingly,
the prosecutor in those cases did not know about the post-conviction conduct "at
the time the defendant [was] arraigned on the first information or indictment"
and the offenses were not "closely related in time," as required by sections 76-1402(2)(b) and 76-1-401. See Lindell, 828 N.W.2d at 1-4; Jones, 915 80.2d at 7881; Roefaro, 691 A.2d at 472-73.
Thus, Utah's single criminal episode statute already protects against giving
the defendant "one free stalk." See Aple. Br.

11.

The City essentially argues that

policy considerations justify carving out an exception to Utah's single criminal
episode laws for stalking. See Aple. Br. 21-30. However, applying Utah's single
criminal episode framework on a case-by-case basis already "protect[s] victims
and reject[s] any interpretation that would allow continued stalking behavior to
potentially go unpunished." Aple. Br. 28.
11
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There is no danger of giving Josephson "one free stalk" by concluding that
his stalking prosecution was barred by the justice court prosecution because both
prosecutions were pending at the same time. See R.445:5-20 (defendant's motion
for directed verdict). The City could and should have dismissed the threat of
violence charge in order to move forward with the stalking. See R-445:10-20. In
the cases of Lindell, Roefaro, and Jones, there was a conviction in the first
prosecution before the subsequent stalking behavior even began. See Lindell, 828
N.W.2d at 1-4; Jones, 915 So.2d at 78-81; Roefaro, 691 A.2d at 472-73.
Accordingly, there was nothing the government could have done to avoid the
multiple prosecutions except to hold off on the first prosecution until there was
enough evidence to prove a stalking, thus giving the defendants "one free stalk."

See Lindell, 828 N.W.2d at 9. Josephson's case is different. The City could have
dismissed the threat of violence charge to move forward on the stalking
prosecution that was pending simultaneously, but it did not.
Third, the City's argument that Josephson has failed to "carry his burden"
to show the offenses were known to the prosecuting attorney when Josephson
was arraigned on the first information fails because it improperly shifts the
burden to Josephson. Aple. Br. 36-37. "It is ... the State's burden to show that an
offense was not known to the prosecuting attorney when the defendant was first
arraigned." State v. Sommerville, 2010 UT App 336, ,I 14, 248 P .3d so,

superseded on other grounds, 2013 UT App 40, 297 P .3d 665.

12
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~

At trial, Josephson asked the district court to dismiss the stalking charge
because "he's been tried by the prosecutor during the pendency of this case and I
think that's a significant situation.... Here, [the City] elected to proceed on the
threat of violence and now the real substantial threat after we've heard all the
evidence is basically what happens then. So then to charge-he's-that needs to
be dismissed otherwise he'll be twice prosecuted for the same offense." R.445: 1020.

"[The present] charges were pending and the threat of violence which is

basically a lesser included offense, he was prosecuted for as an infraction.... [s]o
... I would ask that the motion be granted." R-447:12-22. Trial counsel added
that the single criminal episode issue was "one that's in the control of the
prosecutor and the constitutional standards are designed to place limits on the
prosecutor and they're the one that need to be aware of it and they violated it."
R.447:17-22.

Josephson's trial counsel explained that the City had known about the

GD

conduct underlying both charges and had elected to proceed on two separate
prosecutions simultaneously, but the City made no effort at that time to explain
that it did not in fact know about the conduct underlying both prosecutions or
why it did not dismiss the threat of violence to proceed with the stalking. R-44647.

The City makes no such effort here, either. The City's only argument that
the prosecutor did not know about the offenses at the time of the arraignment on
the first information is that Josephson "fails to address how the prosecutor could
13
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~

have been aware of conduct that occurred on September 30, 2014, at his
~

arraignment eight days prior in the justice court." Aple. Br. 36.
But the stalking case was not based only on conduct that occurred
September 30, 2014. R.132. Even though the original information filed in the
stalking case listed the date of the offense as "on or about September 30, 2014"
(emphasis added), the probable cause statement included behavior that was
ongoing throughout the month of September. R.1. For example, the probable
cause statement mentions that Josephson "keeps taking [D.C.'s] for sale sign"
and is "still threatening [D.C.]." R.1. It also mentions that Josephson yelled, "your
[sic] gonna die fag boy," at D.C., which, according to testimony at trial, happened
on September 7 and not September 30. R.378:4-16. Later, the information was
amended to include the entire month of September. R.132. Behavior that was
ongoing throughout September, such as Josephson stealing D.C.'s for sale sign,
was presented to the jury as the conduct underlying the stalking charge. See

R.355:6-9. The City did not meet its burden to "show that an offense was not
known to the prosecuting attorney when the defendant was first arraigned" below
when Josephson raised the issue at trial, and it does not meet its burden here.
Because Utah's single criminal episode law applies, this Court should
reverse Josephson's stalking conviction and remand for dismissal.

14
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II.

The trial court plainly erred by failing to merge Josephson's
convictions at sentencing.
The City argues that merger does not apply because the threat of violence

statute explicitly exempts threat of violence from the merger doctrine. It also
argues threat of violence is not a lesser included of stalking because the two
offenses have unique elements. Finally, the City contends that the failure to
merge does not meet the plain error standard. Each of these claims fails.
First, the City asserts that merger does not apply because the threat of
violence statute contains an explicit exemption from the merger doctrine. Aple.
Br. 13-16. But, as discussed supra Part I.A., the City's argument fails because the
language in section 76-5-107(5) refers only to punishments and does not exempt
threat of violence from merger.
When the legislature intends to exempt an offense from merger, it uses the
words "does not merge" to explicitly bar the offense from merger or it specifically
indicates that a defendant may be convicted and punished for both the offense
charged and a greater offense. See, e.g., Utah Code§ 76-8-508.3(4) (stating the
crime of retaliation against a witness "does not merge" with any other substantive
crime under the same section); Utah Code § 76-8-508(3) (stating the crime of
witness tampering "does not merge" with any other substantive crime under the
same section); Utah Code§ 76-5-202(5)(a) (stating under the aggravated murder
statute, a predicate offense "does not merge" with the homicide conviction); Utah
Code § 76-5-203(5) ("(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that
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constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of murder" and "(b)
A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in
Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and
punished for, the separate offense.") (emphasis added).
Here, section 76-5-107(5) includes no language about "convictions" or
"merger." It merely says, "A person who commits an offense under this section is

subject to punishment for that offense, in addition to any other offense
committed." This language reads as an enhancement-it allows for additional
punishment but is silent about additional convictions. It is clear from other
statutory schemes that when the legislature intends to exempt a crime from
merger, it does so using specific language relating to merger or convictions. See

supra Part I.A. n.2 (comparing the statutory language of section 76-5-107(5) to
section 76-3-203.1(2), an enhancement provision that provides for "an enhanced
penalty" when certain conditions are met.)
Second, the City argues that threat of violence is not a lesser included
offense of stalking because the two offenses have unique elements. The City's
argument fails because merger applies if any variation of the stalking statute
presented and argued to the jury was such that the stalking course of conduct
could not have been proved without evidence of the purported threat of violence
alleged to have occurred on September 7, 2014. See Aplt. Br. 34-35; see also State

v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1985) (concluding a conviction for a lesser
must be reversed unless the jury was required to find the additional element);
16
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State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ,I 10, 71 P.3d 624 (where crimes have multiple
variations the court will "'consider the evidence [, arguments and jury
instructions] to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between
the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial ... "'); State v. Ross, 951
P.2d 236, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (A conviction for a lesser offense cannot be

upheld "merely because the jury could have found an additional element"
(emphasis added)).
In this case, the prosecution made clear that Josephson's alleged
threatening of D.C. on September 30, 2014, established one of two acts required
to prove stalking. See OB 35 (citing the City's argument at trial that the course of
conduct for stalking was established by "testimony of ongoing threats," a
September 7, 2014, incident, and "September 30th

••• the

officer and [D.C.] are

more believable about what Josephson said and admitted saying that day and
also the defendant was clearly furious at [D.C.])."
The City contends that Josephson failed to demonstrate that refusing to
merge stalking and threat of violence at sentencing was plain error. The City,
however, does not explain its reasoning. See Aple. Br. 38. The merger error
"should have been obvious to the trial court" because it is clear from the plain
language of the threat of violence statute that section 76-5-107(5) refers only to
punishments and does not exempt threat of violence from the merger doctrine.

Compare Utah Code § 76-5-107(5) with Utah Code § 76-8-508.3(4) (stating the
crime of retaliation against a witness does not merge with any other substantive
17
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crime under the same section); Utah Code § 76-8-508(3) (stating the crime of
~

witness tampering does not merge with any other substantive crime under the
same section); Utah Code § 76-5-202(5)(a) (stating under the aggravated murder
statute, a predicate offense does not merge with the homicide conviction).
Also, the error should have been obvious to the trial court because the
merger law was clear and established through Utah case law at the time of
Josephson's sentencing. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,I 16, 95 P .3d 276 ("To
establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [Josephson]
must show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error
was made."). Additionally, Utah law on merger and lesser-included offenses was
well-established prior to Josephson's sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2003
UT App 179, ,I 12, 72 P.3d 692.
The merger determination in this case is not fact-intensive or complex. See

State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I 58, 326 P.3d 645. The question for the Court is
not what the facts of the case are but whether a variation of stalking was
presented and argued to the jury such that stalking could not have been proved
without evidence of the alleged threat of violence on September 7, 2014. See Hill,
674 P.2d at 97 (explaining that offenses stand in a greater-lesser relationship if
one offense is established by "proof of the same or less than all the facts required"
to prove the other). In other words, the question is how the prosecutor presented
and explained the law to the jury. See id. at 98 (considering the variation of
aggravated robbery presented to the jury when deciding whether theft was a
18
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lesser included offense). The Court, having participated in the selection of jucy
instructions and presided over the trial, should have clearly seen that the
variation of stalking the City presented to the jury implicated the merger
doctrine. See id. at 97-98.
Because a variation of the offense presented and argued to the jucy was
such that the stalking course of conduct could not have been proved without
evidence of the purported threat of violence alleged to have occurred on
September 7, 2014, and the failure to merge was both harmful and obvious, the
trial court plainly erred by not merging convictions at sentencing.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Josephson's stalking conviction and remand for
dismissal because the district court prosecution was barred by Utah's lesser
included and single criminal episode laws. In the alternative, this Court should
reverse the threat of violence conviction and remand for dismissal because the
convictions should have merged.
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